IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

PIERCE COUNTY, a local government in the State) of Washington: GLORIA IRENE THEIN, a resident of Pierce County; CITY OF TACOMA, a local government in the State of Washington; WILLIAM LaBORDE, a resident of Pierce County; KING COUNTY, a local government in the State of Washington; KAREN UFFELMAN, a resident of King County, Plaintiffs, and

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CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (a/k/a "SOUND TRANSIT") et al.,

Intervenor Plaintiffs,

VS.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, in its general capacity as defender of I-776, and through its agency the Washington Department of Licensing, Defendant,

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SALISH VILLAGE HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Washington non-profit association, and DENNIS VAUGHN, a citizen and taxpayer resident of King County, Intervenor Defendants.

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PERMANENT OFFENSE

Intervenor Defendant.

No. 02-2-35125-5 SEA

ORDER GRANTING SOUND TRANSIT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Judge Mary I. Yu **King County Superior Court** 516 Third Avenue Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 296-9275

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FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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- 19. Third Declaration of James Klauser,
- 20. Second Declaration of Thomas A. Rubin,
- 21. Declaration of Jack Fagan,
- 22. Declaration of Mike Fagan,
- 23. Declaration of G. Dennis Vaughan, and
- 24. The remaining pleadings in this case.

Based on review of the above-referenced pleadings and argument of counsel, the court being fully informed reaches the following conclusions:

- A. The basic validity of Initiative 776 has been confirmed by the State Supreme Court. The Initiative's language limiting the annual MVET on most vehicles to \$30.00 per year effectively prevents the imposition of any additional MVET in any portion of the state except the Sound Transit district. I-776 prevents Sound Transit from increasing its MVET and collection of the existing tax will cease as soon as the bond obligations are satisfied.
- B. Sound Transit pledged its MVET as security for the repayment of its 1999 Bond Series.
- C. Sound Transit has met is burden of showing that its bondholders expect continued collection of the MVET as part of the financial framework that induced them to purchase the Series 1999 Bonds issued by Sound Transit and that I-776 negatively impacts this financial framework.
- D. I-776 impairs Sound Transit's ability to fulfill its express contractual obligation to bondholders to collect the MVET pledged to secure the Sound Transit Bonds.
- E. I-776 unconstitutionally impairs the contract between bondholders and Sound Transit and violates Article 1, § 23 of the Washington Constitution.
- F. Article 1, § 23 of the Washington Constitution bars repeal of the Sound Transit MVET so long as the Sound Transit Bonds remain outstanding.

- G. Sound Transit is not required to retire the Sound Transit Bonds prior to their maturity, and this court may not rewrite the bond contract to require early retirement. The Supreme Court held that the language of I-776 regarding the Sound Transit Bonds was merely a precatory policy statement without binding effect. This court has no authority to order early retirement of the bonds, nor the power to direct how Sound Transit spends the MVET funds.
- H. Regardless of whether this case presented a proper forum to challenge the formation of Sound Transit, the 1994 amendments to RCW 82.112.030 were properly enacted and constitute the operative law, pursuant to which Sound Transit was validly formed.
- I. Revenue from the local option taxes was properly pledged to secure repayment of the Sound Transit Bonds pursuant to the authority granted in chapters 39.46, 81.104, and 81.112 RCW.
- J. Laches bars the current challenge to the formation and pledging authority of Sound Transit, and
- K. There are no disputed material facts before the court, and Sound Transit is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that

Sound Transit's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Intervenor Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of November, 2004.

KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT